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INTRODUCTION
Since 2000, forty-one states have passed appeal bond reform statutes, a
tort reform measure that, in some shape or form, caps the amount of a
supersedeas bond a defendant must secure in order to stay the execution of
a judgment while pursuing an appeal.1 The state statutes vary widely in
their operation, but their underlying goal is to protect a defendant’s right to
appeal massive damages awards without putting himself in dire financial
straits just to secure a sufficient supersedeas bond.2 Prior to the wave of
reform beginning in 2000, state courts often required a bond in the amount
of the full judgment plus costs and interest, which could be prohibitively
1 The terms “supersedeas bond” and “appeal bond” are often confused. A supersedeas bond is
what a defendant must obtain to secure the judgment and prevent the plaintiff from collecting the
judgment while the case is on appeal. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d). In contrast, an appeal bond
secures the appellant’s costs on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 7; see also Doug Rendleman, A Cap on
the Defendant’s Appeal Bond?: Punitive Damages Tort Reform, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1089, 1096 n.25
(2006) (noting that, although professional usage during the tort reform debates has combined the
terms “supersedeas bond” and “appeal bond,” the two have different technical meanings). Because
the movement to reform state supersedeas bond statutes has largely used the term “appeal bond”
instead of “supersedeas bond,” scholars use the terms interchangeably, as does this Comment. See id.
2 Cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-12-103 (2013) (instituting an appeal bond cap “in order to
ensure that financial considerations do not adversely impact the right of appeal”). But see
Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1143-49 (arguing that appeal bond caps support a defendant’s right to
appeal, but noting that this argument was not thoroughly discussed in many state legislatures
passing the early appeal bond reform statutes).
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expensive if the verdict was for hundreds of millions—or billions—of
dollars.3 This Comment addresses whether state statutes capping supersedeas bond amounts are applicable in federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction, or whether such statutes conflict with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) 62(d)—the rule governing postjudgment stays pursuant
to supersedeas bonds.
Section I.A begins with a discussion of the origins and evolution of supersedeas practice in the federal courts. Section I.B continues with an
explanation of why tort reformers pushed for appeal bond reform and
describes the approaches that various states currently take toward supersedeas practice. Part II provides a brief summary of the evolution of the
Erie4 doctrine. Finally, Part III evaluates the applicability of state appeal
bond reform statutes in federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction, in
light of the Court’s Erie jurisprudence. This Comment concludes that
federal courts should interpret Rule 62(d) as not entirely covering the issue
of how much a defendant must secure by supersedeas bond in order to stay
execution of a judgment during appeal. Rather, federal courts should go on
to apply Erie and its progeny in deciding this issue. Under a traditional Erie
analysis, however, the applicability of appeal bond reform statutes is not
likely to be deemed outcome-determinative. Yet, if a court were to accept
the argument that the applicability of appeal bond caps is an outcomedeterminative decision because such caps sufficiently alter the settlement
landscape, then balancing the state’s interest in capping appeal bonds with
the federal interest in applying Rule 62(d) leads to the conclusion that
federal courts sitting in diversity should apply the state statutes capping
appeal bonds.

I. OVERVIEW OF SUPERSEDEAS BONDS IN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
When a defendant in a civil suit is held liable for monetary damages
following an adverse judgment, he has several options for obtaining review
of the verdict. A defendant may, for example, seek a new trial or review of the
judgment in the trial court,5 or he may seek appellate review if his postverdict
motions prove unsuccessful.6 This Comment focuses on the circumstances
3
4
5
6

See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a), (e).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (granting the United States Courts of Appeal jurisdiction to
hear appeals from final decisions of the United States District Courts).
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surrounding an appeal of an adverse judgment. When a defendant seeks to
avail himself of the appellate process to review the verdict and damages
award, the parties are confronted with a problem: the judgment debtor (the
losing defendant) does not want to pay the award before the appellate
review process is complete, while the judgment creditor (the winning
plaintiff ) wants to collect the judgment without delay. The procedural
solution to this conflict of interest has been to stay execution of the judgment, usually conditioned on the judgment debtor posting a supersedeas
bond or otherwise securing the judgment until the final disposition of the
defendant’s appeal.7 The supersedeas bond serves to “preserve the status
quo while protecting the non-appealing party’s rights pending appeal.”8 The
supersedeas bond maintains the status quo by allowing the defendant to stay
enforcement of the judgment, thereby allowing the defendant to avoid the
risk of having to pursue the plaintiff and seek restitution if the appeal is
successful, while simultaneously securing the monetary award for the
plaintiff in the event the appeal is unsuccessful.9
A. Staying a Judgment on Appeal in Federal Court
In the federal courts, FRCP 62 governs the stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment. While Rule 62(a) generally affords judgment debtors an
automatic fourteen-day stay after entry of an adverse judgment and Rule
62(b) gives the trial judge the discretion to stay any enforcement proceeding
pending the disposition of certain postverdict motions, it is Rules 62(d) and
Rule 62(f) that govern stays during the pendency of an appeal. Rules 62(d)
and 62(f) are the two primary alternatives the Federal Rules provide for the

7 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1094, 1097 (discussing the competing goals that appeal
bonds serve—they help preserve the defendant’s right to appeal while assuring the plaintiff that
payment is available and that the appeal was not entirely frivolous, since the defendant must pay a
bond premium); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d), (f ) (providing that an appellant can obtain a stay
either by posting a supersedeas bond or without posting a bond whenever a stay would be available
according to state law and provided that Rule 62(f )’s other requirements are met); Acevedo-García
v. Vera-Monroig, 296 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 2002) (describing the two ways in which stays are
ordinarily sought—that is, under Rule 62(d) or 62(f )); Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm.
Ass’n, 636 F.2d 755, 757-58 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that a district court may, in its sound
discretion, authorize unsecured or undersecured stays in appropriate cases, such as where an
appellant provides assurances or other adequate security).
8 Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (5th
Cir. 1979).
9 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1098-99 (explaining that appeal bonds are attractive because
a plaintiff can collect directly from the appeal bond should the judgment be affirmed while a
defendant would not have to give up valuable assets and subsequently sue for restitution should
the appellate court reverse); Poplar Grove, 600 F.2d at 1191 (same).
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stay of monetary judgments pending appeal.10 Rule 62(f) provides that “[i]f
a judgment is a lien on the judgment debtor’s property under the law of the
state where the court is located, the judgment debtor is entitled to the same
stay of execution the state court would give.”11 If a judgment debtor is able
to meet the requirements of 62(f), including the conditions required by
state law for a stay of execution, the district court must grant the stay.12
Alternatively, Rule 62(d), the primary focus of this Comment, automatically
stays a monetary judgment once the judgment debtor posts an appropriate
supersedeas bond.13 However, it is important to note that a defendant’s
appeal is not dependent upon obtaining a supersedeas bond. A defendant
can always appeal a verdict from the district court without meeting any of
Rule 62’s requirements. In that scenario, the judgment creditor can move to
collect the judgment as soon as the fourteen-day automatic stay has
elapsed.14
1. Brief History of Supersedeas Practice in the Federal Courts
The federal court system has incorporated supersedeas practice since
the Judiciary Act of 1789.15 Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938, the rules and procedures for obtaining a stay upon
appeal were codified by statute.16 Present-day Rules 62(d) and 62(f) are
substantively the same as the versions contained in the original 1938
edition of the Rules. Rule 62, however, does not “precisely define the
amount and conditions of a supersedeas bond.”17 The original version of the
10
11
12
13

E.g., Acevedo-García, 296 F.3d at 17.
FED. R. CIV. P. 62(f ).
Acevedo-García, 296 F.3d at 17.
Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d) (“If an appeal is taken, the appellant may obtain a stay
by supersedeas bond . . . .”).
14 See Acevedo-García, 296 F.3d at 17 (pointing out that plaintiffs are free to seek execution of
their judgments if a stay has not been granted on any ground).
15 See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 23, 1 Stat. 73, 85; see also Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150, 159
(1883) (“To remedy the inconveniences that arose from an immediate issue of execution before the
appellate proceedings could be perfected, the original judiciary act of 1789 provided . . . that no
execution shall issue upon judgments in the courts of the United States, where a writ of error may
be a supersedeas, until the expiration of ten days after the judgment.”); In re Fed. Facilities Realty
Trust, 227 F.2d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 1955) (explaining that supersedeas practice “is a creature of
statutory origin,” which existed “[f]rom the inception of the federal judiciary”).
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 841 (1934) (repealed 1948) (providing a stay of execution where judgments
are liens on the property of a defendant, which was later adopted by Rule 62(f )); 28 U.S.C. § 874
(1934) (repealed 1948) (allowing the defendant to obtain a supersedeas bond to stay enforcement
of a judgment pending appeal, which was later adopted by Rule 62(d)).
17 Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th
Cir. 1979).
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Rules filled this gap with Rule 73(d), which, in relevant part, directed that
when a defendant obtained a supersedeas bond to stay the enforcement of a
monetary judgment
the amount of the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will cover the whole
amount of the judgment . . . , costs on the appeal, interest, and damages
for delay, unless the court after notice and hearing and for good cause
shown fixes a different amount or orders security other than the bond.18

When the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) became effective in 1968, FRAP 8 abrogated and supplanted FRCP 73.19 However, the
rulemakers neither amended FRCP 62 to include the substance of former
FRCP 73(d) nor wrote FRAP 8 to contain the detail of the rule it supplanted.20 Without FRCP 73(d) directing courts regarding the sufficiency of a
supersedeas bond, the federal courts were left to decide the amount a
defendant had to secure via supersedeas bond in order to receive a stay
under FRCP 62(d).
2. Current Approach to Supersedeas Practice in the Federal Courts
After the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure supplanted former
FRCP 73, the federal courts first had to decide whether posting a supersedeas bond would be a procedural requirement for obtaining a stay pursuant to FRCP 62(d). Former Rule 73(d) had explicitly provided for a stay by
“security other than the bond” if a defendant could show good cause,21 but
Rule 62(d) simply states that the “appellant may obtain a stay by supersedeas bond.” 22 While some courts viewed the supersedeas bond as a
necessary condition for obtaining a stay under Rule 62(d),23 most courts
took the position that Rule 62(d) provided a stay as a matter of right if a
defendant posted a supersedeas bond but retained the discretion to allow for
unsecured stays or stays secured by alternative means.24

18
19
20
21
22
23

FED. R. CIV. P. 73(d), 383 U.S. 1061-62 (1966) (abrogated and supplanted 1968).
Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636 F.2d 755, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 73(d), 383 U.S. 1062 (1966) (abrogated and supplanted 1968).
FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d).
See Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 757 n.3 (citing cases holding that a supersedeas bond
is required to grant a stay under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
24 See id. at 757-58 (rejecting the view that a supersedeas bond is required to stay collection of
a judgment on appeal and holding that the district court has discretion to accept less secure
means); see also Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 944 F. Supp. 371, 374 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing
numerous circuit court decisions holding that district courts have the discretion to allow unsecured
stays).
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Next, the federal courts needed to determine the amount of the judgment a defendant would have to secure by supersedeas bond when pursuing
a stay as a matter of right under Rule 62(d). Again, the prevailing view in
the federal courts has been to follow the directive contained in former Rule
73(d) and to require a supersedeas bond in the amount of the full judgment
plus costs and interest while giving the district courts discretion to set the
bond at a lower amount if an appellant shows good cause.25 Many jurisdictions across the nation have explicitly provided for this method of calculating the amount of a supersedeas bond in their local court rules.26
Judges have considered various factors when faced with a judgment
debtor’s motion to either forego the supersedeas bond requirement in its
entirety, reduce the amount required for the supersedeas bond, or allow an
alternative form of security to obtain a stay. These factors include the
following: (1) the defendant’s financial position and a bond’s threat to the
defendant’s solvency; (2) the confidence the district court has in the defendant’s ability to pay the judgment; (3) the extent to which posting the bond
would be impracticable or impossible; (4) the harm to the defendant if a
stay were not granted; (5) the availability of alternative security arrangements that could protect the appellee; (6) the anticipated length of the
appeal process; (7) the ability of the defendant to remain solvent throughout
the appeal; and (8) the merits of the defendant’s appeal.27 Nevertheless,
some federal courts have refused to depart from their standard requirement
of demanding a supersedeas bond in the amount of the entire judgment,
even in the face of a defendant’s insolvency.28 These courts have generally
25 See Strong v. Laubach, 443 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that district
courts have the discretion to set the amount of the supersedeas bond lower than the full amount of
the judgment); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1154-55 (2d Cir. 1986) (looking to
“equitable principles” to determine the adequate security needed to grant a stay, which may be less
than the amount of the full judgment “when the creditor’s interest . . . would not be unduly
endangered”), rev’d on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987); Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 758
(citing authorities holding that courts can take into account financial hardship and alternative
assurances of payment when setting the required supersedeas bond amount); Poplar Grove
Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979) (allowing the
district court to require less than a full security supersedeas bond if the judgment debtor can
demonstrate reasons for doing so).
26 See, e.g., S.D. FLA. R. 62.1(a) (requiring the full amount of the judgment plus ten percent); E.D. LA. R. 62.2 ( judgment plus twenty percent); D. MASS. R. 62.2 ( judgment plus ten
percent); N.D. TEX. R. 62.1 ( judgment plus twenty percent).
27 2 Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions: Law and Practice § 7:19 (10th ed.
2013); see also Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1100 (providing a list of “good cause” factors that might
move a federal judge “to dispense with an appeal bond or to set a lower bond”).
28 See, e.g., Hurley, 944 F. Supp. at 377-78 (declining to waive or modify the bond requirement solely on the basis of a judgment debtor’s “prospective inability to pay”); Endress + Hauser,
Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 932 F. Supp. 1147, 1148-49, 1150-52 (S.D. Ind. 1996)
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found that the potentially insolvent judgment debtor failed to carry his
burden of proving “good cause,” as required by former Rule 73(d), for lifting
the requirement of a full supersedeas bond.
B. Staying Judgments on Appeal in the State Courts and the
Push for Appeal Bond Reform
The state court systems also have procedures that allow judgment debtors to stay execution of a judgment during the pendency of an appeal,
provided the judgment debtor secures the damages award, usually by
supersedeas bond. Prior to 2000, state supersedeas bond provisions fell into
three broad categories: (1) provisions granting judges the discretion to set
the bond at an amount they deemed appropriate (or to provide for alternative security arrangements), similar to the federal system described above;
(2) provisions mandating the supersedeas bond to cover the amount of the
full judgment (or the full judgment plus costs and interest); 29 and (3)
provisions allowing an automatic stay upon appeal without requiring any
supersedeas bond at all.30 However, in response to several massive jury
verdicts arising from the tobacco litigation, the tort reform movement led a
concerted effort to reform state appeal bond statutes. 31 Several other
enormous jury verdicts outside the tobacco arena, including Texaco Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co.,32 O’Keefe v. Loewen Group, Inc.,33 and the judgment resulting
(refusing to grant a judgment debtor a stay, despite the threat of insolvency, because the debtor
could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on appeal and did not present an alternate plan to
provide adequate security in lieu of a supersedeas bond); United States v. Kurtz, 528 F. Supp. 1113,
1115 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (indicating that an unsupported allegation of financial inability to post a bond
would not suffice in convincing the court to waive the bond requirement).
29 See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 364(b) (repealed 1986) (“When the judgment awards recovery of
a sum of money, the amount of the bond or deposit shall be at least the amount of the judgment,
interest, and costs.”).
30 See, e.g., ME. R. CIV. P. 62(e) (“[T]he taking of an appeal from a judgment shall operate
as a stay of execution upon the judgment during the pendency of the appeal, and no supersedeas
bond or other security shall be required as a condition of such stay.”).
31 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1108 (“A $164 billion appeal bond in a smokers’ class action . . . ushered in the first wave of appeal-bond cap legislation.”); see also Appeal Bond Reform,
AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/issues/appeal-bond-reform (last visited Feb. 21,
2014) [hereinafter ATRA] (listing appeal bond reform as one of the tort reform issues on which
the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) focuses and stating ATRA’s support for “appeal
bond reform legislation that limits the size of an appeal bond when a company is not liquidating
its assets or attempting to flee from justice”).
32 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). This case involved a tortious interference with contract claim that arose out of a failed corporate takeover attempt and resulted in an
$11.12 billion award. Id. at 1137.
33 No. 91-67-423 (Miss. Cir. Ct. 1995), collaterally reviewed by Loewen Group, Inc. v. United
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award ( June 26, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003); see also
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from the Exxon Valdez oil spill,34 provided additional motivation for tort
reformers to push for appeal bond reform.35
1. Motivation for Appeal Bond Reform
One of the problems flowing from massive damages awards was the cost
to obtain a supersedeas bond, which could be prohibitively expensive, even
for large multinational corporations.36 A corporate defendant attempting to
stay execution of a hypothetical jury verdict of $500 million in a state
requiring a supersedeas bond in the amount of 125% of the judgment would
have to put up $625 million to secure the bond, plus an additional 1% to 3%
premium to the surety company.37 A defendant’s failure to post a bond in
such a case would allow the plaintiff to collect on the judgment, possibly
forcing the defendant into dire financial straits or bankruptcy, even if the
defendant has a valid basis for appeal. However, the alternative is just as
bleak—the cost of posting the supersedeas bond can throw the corporate
defendant into bankruptcy, with severe consequences for the business, its
employees, and its other creditors.38 The Second Circuit faced these issues
in Texaco when Texaco argued that Texas’s mandatory supersedeas bond
statute—which would have required a bond of more than $12 billion to stay
execution of the $11.12 billion judgment—violated its constitutional due
process rights. 39 The Second Circuit agreed, holding that it would be
impossible for Texaco to post a $12 billion bond, despite having a net worth
of $23 billion: obtaining a bond of such magnitude would push the company
into liquidation or bankruptcy.40 The court went on to explain that the
Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1128 (explaining how the Canadian defendant Raymond Loewen,
unable to pay for an appeal bond of 125% of the $500 million verdict, thought “that the bond
requirement foreclosed his right to appeal” and decided to settle for $129 million).
34 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 481 (2008) (noting that the original jury
verdict against Exxon totaled $5 billion, and was subsequently reduced to $2.5 billion by the court
of appeals).
35 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1089-90 (summarizing “lawsuits with blockbuster damages,”
including Texaco, O’Keefe, and the Exxon Valdez suit).
36 See id. at 1102-03; see also ATRA, supra note 31 (noting that appealing a billion-dollar verdict “can force an individual, a company, or an industry into bankruptcy”).
37 See, e.g., Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1102 & n.54, 1128; Jonathan Harr, The Burial, NEW
YORKER, Nov. 1, 1999, at 70, 93.
38 See Mark A. Behrens & Andrew W. Crouse, The Evolving Civil Justice Reform Movement:
Procedural Reforms Have Gained Steam, but Critics Still Focus on Arguments of the Past, 31 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 173, 183 (2006) (naming workers and shareholders as victims of bond-induced bankruptcy);
Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1129-30 (noting that bankruptcy harms not only the judgment debtor,
but also its creditors, suppliers, employees, shareholders, and the state’s business climate).
39 Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1136-39 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
40 Id. at 1138, 1152.
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mandatory bond requirement lacked “any rational basis, since it would destroy
Texaco and render its right to appeal in Texas an exercise in futility.”41
Looking instead to the discretionary approach of the federal courts in
setting supersedeas bond amounts, the court allowed Texaco to post a bond
in an amount substantially less than the $12 billion demanded by the Texas
state courts.42
To alleviate the injustice of imposing severe obstacles to a defendant’s
ability to appeal, tort reformers began a movement to sway state legislatures
to cap the amount a defendant must pay to secure a supersedeas bond.43
However, the political will to adopt appeal bond reform measures did not
materialize in state legislatures until 2000, when massive jury verdicts
against tobacco companies threatened the payment streams that states were
receiving under the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).44 As a consequence, the first wave of appeal bond reform legislation largely focused on
limiting the amount a signatory to the MSA (i.e., the tobacco companies
facing multibillion dollar verdicts and their successors and affiliates) could
be forced to pay to secure a supersedeas bond.45 Since 2000, however, appeal
bond reform has swept the nation, with many states passing statutes that
apply to any defendant in a civil case, not just signatories to the MSA.
Currently, forty-one states cap appeal bonds, either legislatively or by court
rule.46 Five additional states automatically suspend execution of a judgment
when a case is on appeal without requiring the defendant to post a supersedeas bond.47 Four states have not capped appeal bonds in any manner.48

41
42
43
44

Id. at 1145.
Id. at 1154-57.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
Behrens & Crouse, supra note 38, at 183; Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1108, 1112; see also N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:4D-13(a)(3) (West 2009) (“If a tobacco company faced with a large judgment
could not afford to post a bond under State law it might be forced to declare bankruptcy, and this
could interrupt the flow of payments to the State under the [MSA].”).
45 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1108-16. For an example of this type of appeal bond reform
statute, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104558(a) (West 2005), which imposes an appeal
bond cap of $150 million for MSA signatories and their affiliates and successors.
46 See ATRA, supra note 31 (listing forty states that have passed appeal bond reform legislation and providing a brief description of the cap each state has instituted). In addition to the forty
states listed on the ATRA website, Illinois has also passed a cap on appeal bonds. See 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-1306 (2013).
47 These states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont. See CONN. R. APP. P.
§ 61-11; ME. R. C IV. P. 62(e); MASS. R. CIV. P. 62(d); VT. R. CIV. P. 62(d).
48 These states are Alaska, Delaware, Maryland, and New York. See ALASKA R. APP. P.
204(d), 603(a); DEL. CT. C.P.R. 62(c); MD. RULES 8-423; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5519 (McKinney 1995).
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2. Varieties of Appeal Bond Reform Statutes and
Their Underlying Rationales
The forty-one states with reform statutes have passed a variety of appeal
bond caps. Some states have only capped the amount necessary to secure
punitive damages, 49 while others have capped the amount necessary to
secure all damages.50 Some states allow appeal bond caps to protect all civil
defendants, 51 others have special appeal bond caps that apply to small
businesses,52 and many other states cap appeal bonds only for MSA signatories and their successors and affiliates.53 To protect judgment creditors, the
states that do cap appeal bonds allow a bond up to the full judgment amount
if a court finds that the judgment debtor is intentionally dissipating his
assets to avoid paying the judgment.54
The variety of appeal bond cap provisions is explained by the different
rationales set forth to support them. As discussed above, an initial motivating factor for state legislatures was the need to protect the payment streams
that states derived from the MSA.55 Nevertheless, there are many other
arguments that support appeal bond caps. First and foremost, appeal bond
caps protect the right of a defendant to appeal without immediately forcing
that defendant into bankruptcy as a consequence.56 Since it is not uncommon for excessive jury verdicts to eventually get overturned on appeal, a
prohibitive supersedeas bond requirement allows some erroneous judgments
49
50
51

See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 13-202(2) (2010) (instituting a cap of $1 million).
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-125 (West 2005) (instituting a cap of $25 million).
See, e.g., id. (creating a cap for supersedeas bonds “[i]n any civil action brought under any
legal theory”).
52 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 607-26(1) (Supp. 2011) (providing a cap of $1 million).
53 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4D-13(b) (West 2009) (capping supersedeas bond amounts
“in civil litigation under any legal theory involving a signatory, a successor of a signatory, or any
affiliate of a signatory to the [MSA]”).
54 See, e.g., id. § 52:4D-13(c) (“[I]f an appellee proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that an appellant is dissipating assets outside the ordinary course of business to avoid payment of a
judgment, a court may [order the appellant] . . . to post a bond in an amount up to the total
amount of the judgment.”).
55 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
56 See Behrens & Crouse, supra note 38, at 184-85 (arguing for an appeal bond reform act
“intended to ensure that a defendant can appeal a massive judgment without being put out of
business”); Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1125 (“Appeal bond caps are necessary so that defendants
don’t have to go bankrupt merely to pursue an appeal . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also Ariz. House of Representatives Comm. on Judiciary, House of Representatives Committee
on Judiciary Minutes (Mar. 3, 2011), 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (2011) [hereinafter Meeting Minutes]
(statement of Marcus Osborn, Manager of Government and Public Affairs, Arizona Manufacturers Council and Arizona Chamber of Commerce), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/
50leg/1R/comm_min/House/030311%20JUD.PDF ( justifying an appeal bond cap on the basis that
a business’s ability to perform should not be hindered by having to set aside resources to appeal).
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to evade review by appellate courts. 57 Second, by facilitating appellate
review of potentially erroneous judgments, appeal bond caps help preserve
the judicial system’s reputation for fairness and accuracy. 58 Third, and
crucial to the Erie analysis below, massive bonding requirements can create
an unfair negotiating advantage for plaintiffs in settlement discussions.59 If
a defendant knows or suspects that he will not be able to afford the appeal
bond, a plaintiff could pressure the defendant into a settlement he would
not otherwise have accepted.60 Fourth, appeal bond caps protect a defendant
company’s constituents, including its employees and other creditors, from
the risk of the defendant entering bankruptcy in order to appeal a trial court
judgment.61 As evidenced by the range of appeal bond caps that states have
employed, some arguments exert greater influence than others.
Given the variety of rationales and appeal bond reform statutes adopted
by the states, the question arises whether federal district courts sitting in
diversity must abide by the directive of a state appeal bond cap when setting
the amount of a supersedeas bond, or whether a district court can, in its
discretion, set an amount above the state statutory cap.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S ERIE DOCTRINE EVOLUTION
In Hanna v. Plumer,62 the Supreme Court clarified that the “Erie doctrine”63 could be broken down into two distinct parts.64 First, when confronted
57 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1125 (“If defendant’s appeal is precluded by inability to post
an exorbitant appeal bond, an appellate court’s ability to correct error and formulate legal
standards will be frustrated.”).
58 See id. at 1146 (“[A]n appeal is . . . a basic component of our idea of a fair and accurate
decisionmaking system.”).
59 See id. at 1126 (arguing that requiring appeal bonds in the full value of the judgment gives
the plaintiff unfair leverage in settlement negotiations); see also Meeting Minutes, supra note 56
(statement of Sen. Al Melvin) (stating that the appeal bond reform legislation would encourage
proper settlements); Behrens & Crouse, supra note 38, at 184 (“[T]o add insult to injury, the
defendant will most likely be forced to settle on unfavorable terms and pay a premium because it
has been placed over a barrel.”). As to the impact of a changed settlement landscape on the Erie
analysis, at least one scholar has argued that a federal court cannot choose a rule that would alter
the “expected value” of a claim in litigation. Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64
VAND. L. REV. 877, 880-81 (2011).
60 See, e.g., Harr, supra note 37, at 93-95 (discussing Raymond Loewen’s predicament in
O’Keefe).
61 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
62 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
63 In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court had to decide whether state law or federal
law determined the duty of care standard in a typical personal injury case arising out of a train
accident. 304 U.S. 64, 629-70 (1938). In overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)—
which held that federal courts were “free to exercise an independent judgment as to what the
common law of the State is—or should be,” Erie, 304 U.S. at 71 (citing Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at
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with a possible vertical choice-of-law issue, a federal court must ask whether
the Constitution or Congress has already directed that federal law apply in
the given scenario.65 Professor Freer has termed this analysis the “Hanna
prong” of the Erie doctrine.66 If a constitutional provision,67 Federal Rule,68
or federal statute69 controls the issue at hand, it will trump contrary state
law unless the federal directive is invalid.70 For a Federal Rule to be valid, it
must meet the requirements of the Rules Enabling Act (REA) and not
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”71 Since the choice-of-law
decision is clear if a court finds that there is a valid Federal Rule on point,
the crucial analysis under the Hanna prong is whether the Federal Rule
“controls the issue.”72 When there is no constitutional provision or congressional directive on point, a court undertakes the second part of the analysis
under the Erie doctrine, what Professor Freer has termed the “RDA
prong.”73 However, this analysis leads a court down the murky and often

18)—the Erie Court held that “[t]here is no federal general common law.” Id. at 78. Instead, the law
of the state should be applied in suits brought in federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction,
unless the “matters [are] governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress.” Id.
Ultimately, the Erie doctrine demands that when federal courts sitting in diversity are ruling on
questions of substantive state law, they must apply the state’s substantive law, but are free to
impose federal procedural law. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465. The Erie decision was largely motivated by
the Court’s concern with the preferential treatment that out-of-state citizens could receive by
choosing to bring their suits in federal court. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75. The two effects of this
injustice—forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws—would later become
known as the “twin aims of Erie.” See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
64 See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1637, 1637 (1998).
65 Id. (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471).
66 Id.
67 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (mandating that
state law govern civil actions except where the “Constitution or treaties of the United States or
Acts of Congress” provide otherwise).
68 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (clarifying that there is no Erie analysis to be made “[w]hen a
situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules”).
69 See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) (“[A] district court sitting in diversity must apply a federal statute that controls the issue before the court and that represents a valid
exercise of Congress’ constitutional powers.”).
70 Id.; Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
71 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). The Supreme Court has never found a Federal Rule to violate
the REA. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Introduction: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 63 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 91, 101 (2010), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/articles/2010/10/BurchIntroduction-to-Dukes-Roundtable-77-Vand.-L.-Rev.-En-Banc-10-2010.pdf.
72 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 27.
73 Freer, supra note 64, at 1637 (deriving this name from the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652).
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unhelpful path of distinguishing between matters of “substance” and
“procedure.”74
A. The Evolution of the Court’s Hanna-Prong Analysis
The Court has grappled with interpreting the Federal Rules for over
sixty years.75 At times, the Court has construed the Federal Rules narrowly
to avoid addressing a conflict with the REA or a contrary state law.76 In
other cases, the Court has interpreted the Federal Rules broadly to find a
conflict and have the Federal Rule govern.77 As an example of the former
trend, in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,78 the Court
purposefully sidestepped the REA when it had to interpret the language of
FRCP 41(b).79 Despite Rule 41(b)’s directive that “any dismissal not under
this rule” (as was the case in Semtek) “operates as an adjudication on the
merits,” 80 the Court decided that a judgment “on the merits” was not
“necessarily a judgment entitled to claim-preclusive effect.”81 As commentators have pointed out, “the Court’s interpretation strain[ed] the Rule’s text
and contravene[d] its history” in order to escape a conflict with the REA.82
The Court similarly gave FRCP 3 a narrow construction in Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., holding that the plain meaning of the rule was that it “governs
the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin
to run, but does not affect state statutes of limitations.”83 In so doing, the

74
75

See id.
See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1949) (construing the
scope of Rule 23 to allow for the application of state law).
76 See infra notes 78-84, 87-88 and accompanying text.
77 See infra notes 85-86, Error! Bookmark not defined.-94 and accompanying text.
78 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
79 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1452 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Semtek as a case where the Court avoided interpreting FRCP 41(b) in a
way that would violate the REA’s jurisdictional limitation).
80 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
81 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503.
82 Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1150 (2002) (citing Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping,
and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1039-47 (2002)).
83 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980). But see id. at 750 n.9 (“This is not to suggest that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a ‘direct collision’ with
state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning.”). Interestingly, seven years later,
when the Court had another opportunity to consider Rule 3 in the context of a federal question
case, the Court interpreted it as a tolling provision, to the exclusion of the timing requirements
contained within the federal statute that served as the basis of the lawsuit. West v. Conrail, 481
U.S. 35, 39-40 (1987).
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Court avoided a conflict between Rule 3 and an Oklahoma state law regarding statute of limitations.84
In contrast, in Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, the Court gave
FRAP 38 an expansive meaning, vesting broad discretion in federal judges
to assess “just damages” when sanctioning a frivolous appeal.85 The Court
determined that a conflicting state rule, which mandated a ten percent
penalty when certain conditions were met, would have impermissibly
limited this discretion and was therefore displaced by the Federal Rule.86
Nearly a decade later in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., the Court,
citing Walker, instructed that federal courts interpret the scope of the
Federal Rules “with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory
policies.”87 This ruling cast some doubt on the instruction the Court gave in
Walker—to read the Federal Rules according to their plain meaning.88
In the Court’s most recent pronouncement on demarcating the scope of
the Federal Rules, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
the majority interpreted FRCP 23 very broadly. 89 At issue was a New York
state tort reform measure, Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) § 901(b),
which prohibited class actions for certain types of claims. 90 The Court
rejected the argument that Rule 23 and § 901(b) could coexist if they were
interpreted such that Rule 23 reached the issue of class “certifiability” while
§ 901(b) addressed class “eligibility.” 91 The Court instead guaranteed a
conflict with state law, and as a valid procedural rule, Rule 23 controlled the
issue in the case.92 Importantly, Justice Scalia, desiring a uniform application of the Federal Rules, declared that a Federal Rule’s validity does not
depend on the state interest involved.93 Rather, the validity of a Federal
Rule under the REA is entirely dependent on whether it can reasonably be
classified as procedural.94 While the Court has taken different approaches in

84
85
86
87
88

Walker, 446 U.S. at 752.
480 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1987).
Id. at 3, 8.
518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996).
See Freer, supra note 64, at 1643 (“[T]he Court . . . may have replaced the search for
‘plain meaning’ with a heightened sensitivity to potential impact on state policy.”).
89 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
90 Id. at 1436-37 (majority opinion).
91 Id. at 1438.
92 As noted above, the Court has never found a Federal Rule to violate the REA. See Burch,
supra note 71, at 101.
93 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (plurality opinion).
94 Id.
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interpreting the Federal Rules, when a particular rule is found to govern,
the outcome is unavoidable: a federal court must apply it.95
B. The Evolution of the Court’s RDA-Prong Analysis
Conducting an analysis under the RDA prong, the Erie Court overturned Swift v. Tyson 96 —which had allowed federal courts exercising
diversity jurisdiction to ignore “the unwritten law of the State as declared
by its highest court”—and instead permitted the courts “to exercise an
independent judgment as to what the common law of the State is—or
should be.”97 In Erie, no constitutional or congressional directive addressed
what duty of care a railroad company owed to pedestrians; as a result, the
Court directed federal courts to apply a state’s substantive law when faced
with state substantive law claims in diversity suits.98 This makes sense since
the basic principles of federalism suggest that the Constitution does not
give the federal courts authority to create substantive law.99 Consequently,
state substantive law should apply, even in federal courts.100 In the decades
following Erie, however, the Court’s approach to the RDA prong went
through several iterations.
1. Outcome-Determinative Approach
First, in the two decades following Erie, the Court gravitated toward an
“outcome-determinative” approach to the RDA prong, most famously
exemplified in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 101 The Guaranty Trust Court
interpreted Erie to mandate that “in all cases where a federal court [exercises
diversity jurisdiction], the outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome
of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”102 However, as the
lower courts quickly realized, virtually every law, whether substantive or
95 See id. at 1437 (majority opinion) (“The framework for our decision is familiar. We must
first determine whether [the Federal Rule] answers the question in dispute. If it does, it governs . . . .” (citation omitted)).
96 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
97 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71, 79-80 (1938).
98 Id. at 78.
99 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1645 (“The constitutional basis of Erie is the principle, inherent
in federalism and embodied in the Tenth Amendment, of reserved powers. Because the federal
courts have no enumerated authority under the Constitution to prescribe rules of substantive law
in diversity cases, state law must govern.” (footnote omitted)).
100 See id.
101 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
102 Id. at 109.
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procedural, could have an outcome-determinative effect. 103 Unless the
federal courts sitting in diversity were to become clones of their state court
counterparts, the outcome-determinative test alone could not reliably
resolve the choice-of-law conflict.
2. Federal–State Interest-Balancing Approach
With its 1958 decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,104
the Court began to supplement the outcome-determinative test. Outcome
determination alone would not be decisive; instead, the Court created a
three-step analysis to determine whether state or federal law should apply.105 First, a federal court must ask whether state law determines the
rights and obligations of the parties—whether the state law at issue is
“bound up” with state rights and obligations.106 Second, if it is not clear that
the state law at issue is substantive, federal courts should conduct an
outcome-determinative test.107 However, even if applying federal law could,
or would, lead to a different outcome, federal law should apply if there are
“affirmative countervailing considerations” favoring the federal law. 108
Third, if applying federal law would not be outcome-determinative, the
Court suggested that federal courts balance the state interests involved with
the countervailing interests of the federal judicial system.109 If a state’s
interests are sufficiently strong, then absent a compelling federal policy
reason to apply the federal law, a federal court should apply the state’s law.110

103 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1647 (“To take an absurd example, a rule that pleadings be on a
certain length of paper will determine the outcome if the plaintiff tries to file a complaint on
nonconforming paper.”). Note that the Court in Erie, while very much concerned with litigant
equality, did not pass judgment on the need for outcome equality. Id. at 1645-46. It was the
Guaranty Trust Court that largely “converted the concern for litigant equality to a concern for
outcome equality.” Id.
104 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
105 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1647 (noting that while “there are other interpretations of Byrd,
the most literal proceeds in three steps” (footnote omitted)).
106 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535.
107 Id. at 536-37.
108 Id. at 537-38. In Byrd, the important federal interest in the proper allocation of power
between judge and jury was strong enough to apply the federal rule even if there was a chance that
doing so would be outcome-determinative. Id.
109 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1650; cf. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER
& EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4504, at 36-40 (2d ed.
1996) (describing different formulations of the Byrd balancing test).
110 Cf. Freer, supra note 64, at 1650. (“The federal courts can . . . be conscripted to help
enforce a state policy, but not if doing so will harm the integrity of the federal judicial system.”
(citing Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538)).
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However, the Byrd test was plagued with its own ambiguities, such as
deciphering which countervailing federal interests justified departing from a
state rule.111 As a consequence, the Byrd test never quite took hold in the
lower courts, and when the Supreme Court next addressed the Erie doctrine
in Hanna v. Plumer, the Court barely mentioned its Byrd balancing test,
leaving many to question whether the Byrd test remained a viable framework for an Erie problem.112
3. Modified Outcome-Determinative Approach
In Hanna, the Court returned to the initial underpinnings of Erie, seeking to prevent (1) vertical forum shopping (litigants choosing to sue in
federal court rather than in state court) and (2) the inequitable administration of the laws (diverse parties obtaining more favorable outcomes in
federal court than in state court).113 Therefore, under Hanna, the question is
not simply whether the outcome would be different in federal court, but
whether application of federal law would produce forum shopping or the
inequitable administration of the laws.114 Importantly, the Court clarified
that a state law would only apply if the inquiry were answered in the
affirmative ex ante—that is, at the time when the plaintiff decides where to
file suit.115 Setting aside the fact that the Court’s RDA analysis in Hanna
was dictum, one of the more troubling questions arising out of Hanna was
how this new test was to be applied in conjunction with the previous tests
announced by the Court.116 Instead of repudiating one test and replacing it
with another, the Court continued to create new approaches without
advising how the different tests would work together.
4. A Rebirth of Byrd?
Although commentators still debate whether Byrd survived Hanna,117 the
Court made clear in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. that the Byrd
111
112

See 19 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 109, § 4504, at 36.
See id. at 48-49 (“The status of the Byrd case . . . is less certain.”); Freer, supra note 64,
at 1653-54 (questioning the status of the Byrd test following Hanna).
113 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965).
114 Id. at 468 (“The outcome-determination test . . . cannot be read without reference to
the twin aims of the Erie rule . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
115 Id. at 468-69.
116 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1653-54 (raising the question “of how Byrd [was] to function
with the twin aims test” given that the Hanna Court did not discuss or “purport to overrule”
Byrd).
117 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 987, 1001-02 (2011) (arguing that Byrd did survive Hanna).
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balancing test was alive and well.118 Interestingly, the Court decided to
revive Byrd in the context of its Hanna-prong analysis, not its RDA analysis.119 Nonetheless, it became clear that the Byrd balancing test was still a
valid interpretive tool, as balancing the state and federal interests at play is
a helpful exercise when conducting an RDA analysis.
In Gasperini, the Court dealt with a New York state law, CPLR
§ 5501(c), that set forth a standard for appellate review of jury verdicts and
gave appellate courts the power to order a remittitur when the award
“deviat[ed] materially from what would be reasonable compensation.”120
This case presented two distinctive Erie conflicts: (1) a conflict with the
Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause; and (2) a conflict with FRCP
59(a).121 With regard to the Seventh Amendment conflict, the Court had to
decide both the proper standard in the trial court for reviewing a motion to
alter a jury verdict and the proper standard for appellate review of the trial
court’s determination.122 Here, the Court, discussing the Byrd balancing test,
decided it could accommodate the state and federal interests at play by
having the trial court apply New York’s “deviates materially” standard while
allowing a federal appellate court to review the trial court’s determination
using an “abuse of discretion” standard.123 Additionally, by permitting a
district court to order a new trial when a jury verdict “deviated materially”
from what would be reasonable compensation, the Gasperini majority
concluded that Rule 59(a) was not instructive on the standard to be used in
evaluating jury awards, and consequently, on whether a new trial should be
granted.124
Had Rule 59(a) covered the issue, as Justice Scalia argued in dissent,
Hanna clearly required that the Federal Rule govern. 125 The majority,
acknowledging the difficulty in distinguishing between matters of substance
and procedure, viewed the New York directive as a procedural mechanism

118 See 518 U.S. 415, 431-32 (1996) (discussing and citing to Byrd). But see Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1924, 1949 (2006) (arguing that the Court has not revived Byrd and pointing out that the Gasperini
Court “ignored [Byrd] in dealing with the problem on which it might have made a difference and
invoked [Byrd] on the problem for which it was redundant” (footnote omitted)).
119 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1656 (observing that “the RDA discussion in Gasperini does not
mention Byrd”).
120 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418.
121 See id. at 426, 433.
122 Id. at 433-35.
123 Id. at 437-38.
124 See id. at 433 (interpreting Rule 59(a) as saying simply that federal courts could grant a
new trial after a jury trial on any ground recognized at common law).
125 See id. at 467-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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with substantive goals.126 In this way, the majority interpreted Rule 59(a)
“with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies” in
order to avoid a conflict, 127 thereby distancing the Court from Walker’s
directive to interpret the Federal Rules in accordance with their plain
meaning.128
III. APPLYING THE ERIE DOCTRINE TO STATE APPEAL BOND
REFORM STATUTES AND FEDERAL RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 62(d)
FRCP 62(d) allows a district court judge to stay execution of a judgment while a judgment debtor’s appeal works its way through the appellate
process. Because Rule 62(d) does not specify the amount a judgment debtor
must post in order to secure a stay, the federal courts have read the Rule
consistently with former Rule 73(d), which, while expressing a preference
for a bond in the amount of the judgment plus costs and interest, allowed
judges discretion to accept a lesser amount if the judgment debtor could
show good cause.129 Any state statute that caps the amount of a supersedeas
bond, if applied in federal court, would ostensibly take away the discretion
federal judges have enjoyed in setting supersedeas bond amounts throughout the federal judiciary’s existence.130 This Part applies the Court’s evolving Erie doctrine to the conflict between Rule 62(d) and state statutes
capping appeal bonds.
A. Hanna-Prong Analysis of Rule 62(d) and State Appeal Bond
Reform Provisions
Is Rule 62(d) broad enough to cover the question of how much a defendant must secure via supersedeas bond to stay enforcement proceedings

126 Id. at 429. The majority classified CPLR § 5501(c) as substantive because the New York
directive “was designed to provide an analogous control” to statutory caps on damages, which both
parties agreed were substantive. Id.
127 Id. at 427 n.7.
128 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1642-43.
129 See supra Section I.A (describing the historical underpinnings of the supersedeas bond
and the current federal practice with regard to Rule 62(d)).
130 See supra Section I.A. Local court rules across the country have filled in the gap created
when the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure supplanted former Rule 73(d) and instruct judges
as to the sufficiency of a supersedeas bond. See supra note 26 (providing examples of such local
court rules). However, local rules are not afforded the same deference as the congressionally
approved Federal Rules. See Ashland Chem. Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261, 264 n.2 (5th Cir. 1997)
(“[W]e decline to extend Hanna’s more lenient scrutiny of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
include [a] Local Rule.”).
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in a case where a damages award (inclusive of compensatory and punitive
damages) is in excess of a state’s statutory cap on appeal bonds? In light of
the wave of appeal bond reform and the significant state interests motivating these reforms, it is possible to read Rule 62(d) as not covering the entire
issue of supersedeas bond requirements, but instead leaving room for the
application of state statutes.131
1. State Appeal Bond Reform Statutes Do Not Affect
Rule 62(d)’s Process Requirements
The issue of setting supersedeas bond amounts can be distinguished
from the cases holding that where state supersedeas bond statutes conflict
with a specific command of Rule 62, the Rule governs. For example, when a
state statute prescribes a certain mandatory process for filing a supersedeas
bond that conflicts with the mandate of Rule 62(d), the Federal Rule
governs. In Vacation Village, Inc. v. Clark County, a Nevada statute required
that a state agency deposit with the court the full judgment amount before
disputing a monetary judgment on appeal.132 The Ninth Circuit correctly
held that this requirement directly conflicted with Rule 62(d)’s command
that an appellant may secure a stay as a matter of right upon posting a
satisfactory supersedeas bond.133 As a “purely procedural” rule addressing
the process for obtaining a stay, Hanna undisputedly commands federal
courts sitting in diversity to apply Rule 62(d) if it covers the situation.134
Similarly, other courts, when confronted with state statutes that allow for
public entities to obtain a stay on appeal without posting a supersedeas
bond or other form of security, have routinely held that Rule 62(d)
preempts these statutes.135 The rationale here is that federal courts must
follow Rule 62(d)’s policy of requiring security, via supersedeas bond or

131 There are, of course, limits to this interpretation. For example, a state statute capping the
amount a defendant must secure by supersedeas bond at $1000, regardless of the amount of the
judgment, would be untenable. Such a statute would violate the purpose behind Rule 62(d), which
is “to preserve the status quo while protecting the non-appealing party’s rights pending appeal.”
Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (5th Cir.
1979). A state’s appeal bond reform statute cannot be allowed to make Rule 62(d) a meaningless
formality. Rather, a state’s statute should only apply in federal court if it promotes an important
substantive state interest and does not violate the purpose behind Rule 62(d).
132 497 F.3d 902, 913 (9th Cir. 2007).
133 Id. at 913-14.
134 See id. (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465, 471-72 (1965), and Bass v. First Pac.
Networks, Inc., 219 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000)).
135 See Leuzinger v. County of Lake, 253 F.R.D. 469, 474-75 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (discussing
several cases holding that, when Rule 62(d) conflicts with a state law, Rule 62(d) prevails).
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otherwise, before a stay is granted.136 Again, however, the courts take issue
with the fact that a state law is supplanting the process for obtaining a postjudgment stay, not the adequacy of a bond posted pursuant to the proper
federal process.137
In contrast, state appeal bond caps do not supplant the process for securing a postjudgment stay. The appeal bond reform statutes comply with Rule
62’s policy of disfavoring unsecured stays during the pendency of an
appeal.138 Rule 62(d) appears, by its plain meaning, to only regulate the
procedure for securing a postjudgment stay. However, whether the Rule is
given a narrow or broad construction will determine whether Rule 62(d) in
fact covers the scenario at issue.
2. Appeal Bond Caps and Judicial Discretion
Appeal bond caps do, however, restrict the discretion judges can exercise
in setting supersedeas bond amounts pursuant to Rule 62(d). According to
Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, when a Federal Rule provides for
judicial discretion, a mandatory state rule that interferes with that discretion will not be given effect in federal court.139 In Burlington Northern, the
Court interpreted FRAP 38, which gives judges the discretion to award
“just damages” to an appellee upon a determination that the appellant
pursued a frivolous appeal. 140 Rule 38 allows judges to determine the
amount of damages, if any, that should be awarded on a case-by-case basis,
while the conflicting state rule mandated a ten percent penalty across the
board when certain criteria were met.141 Reading Rule 38 broadly, the Court
held the mandatory state provision inapplicable in federal courts because it
would have the effect of requiring a federal court to assess specific damages,
whereas the court may otherwise have assessed a lesser amount—or none at
all.142 Similarly, in Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp., the Court held that a
state law disfavoring forum-selection clauses was not applicable in federal

136
137

Id. at 475.
See id. (holding that “Rule 62 provides the process for post-judgment stays,” thereby supplanting any state law that allows for a postjudgment stay to be granted without posting security).
138 See Van Huss v. Landsberg, 262 F. Supp. 867, 870 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (“Rule 62 . . . indicates
a policy against any unsecured stay of execution after the expiration of the time for filing a motion
for new trial.”).
139 480 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1987); see also Benjamin Grossberg, Comment, Uniformity, Federalism, and
Tort Reform: The Erie Implications of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 217, 242 (2010).
140 480 U.S. at 7.
141 Id. at 3-4.
142 Id. at 7-8.
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courts if it interfered with a district court’s exercise of discretion in conducting a transfer-of-venue analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).143
A federal court could follow the approach of these cases by broadly construing FRCP 62(d) and concluding that the Rule covers the issue of setting
the amount of a supersedeas bond. Under this construction, since state
statutes capping supersedeas bonds would interfere with a Federal Rule’s
“discretionary mode of operation,” these statutes should be inapplicable in
the federal courts.144
This approach, however, is not a foregone conclusion. The discretionary
aspect of Rule 62(d) is distinguishable from the provisions in dispute in
Burlington Northern and Stewart. In Burlington Northern, the Court worried
that the mandatory operation of the Alabama penalty provision could force
a federal court to assess damages for a nonfrivolous appeal, where FRAP 38
would not have directed a judge to do so. 145 Likewise, in Stewart, the
application of the Alabama statute, which discouraged the application of
forum-selection clauses “providing for out-of-state venues,”146 would have
altered the analysis § 1404(a) demanded.147 Conversely, FRCP 62(d) does
not allow judges discretion to stay execution of the judgment upon the
posting of a supersedeas bond; the stay is automatic once a court approves
the bond.148 The discretion the court retains is whether to approve the bond
or not.149 Thus, state appeal bond cap statutes would not be forcing judges
to grant stays where they otherwise would not have done so; such statutes
would only fill in the details as to the sufficiency of a supersedeas bond.

143 487 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1988). The federal law here allows district courts, in their discretion, to
transfer any civil action to another district in the country. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006); Stewart, 487
U.S. at 29. The state law in question, in categorically disfavoring forum-selection clauses, would
have impermissibly instructed a district court to give more weight to one factor—the presence of a
forum-selection clause—than other factors in its transfer analysis. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30-31.
144 See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 7. If Rule 62(d) were broad enough to control the
issue, it would govern absent some contention that the Rule violated the Constitution or the REA.
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
145 See 480 U.S. at 8 (“Federal Rule 38 adopts a case-by-case approach to identifying and
deterring frivolous appeals; the Alabama statute precludes any exercise of discretion within its
scope of operation.”).
146 487 U.S. at 30.
147 See id. at 31 (“Congress has directed that multiple considerations govern transfer within
the federal court system, and a state policy focusing on a single concern or a subset of the factors
identified in § 1404(a) would defeat that command.”).
148 Rule 62(d) states that “the appellant may obtain a stay by supersedeas bond.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 62(d). It does not state that the court may grant a stay if an appellant posts a supersedeas
bond.
149 See id. (“The stay takes effect when the court approves the bond.”).
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Rule 62(d)’s statutory predecessor, 28 U.S.C. § 874,150 directed an appellant to “giv[e] the security required by law” in order to stay a judgment
upon appeal.151 The substance of § 874 was incorporated into Rule 62(d)
and former Rule 73(d).152 However, when the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure supplanted former Rule 73(d) without incorporating its substance
as to the sufficiency of a supersedeas bond, the Federal Rules lacked any
explicit direction as to what security was “required by law.”153 Consequently,
federal courts have largely continued to read Rule 62(d) in light of former
Rule 73(d).154 Federal supersedeas practice, both past and present, clearly
evinces a policy to require an appellant to provide security on appeal.
However, existing federal practice also takes into consideration circumstances when a supersedeas bond in the full amount of a judgment would
not be required.155 Therefore, rather than supplanting judicial discretion,
one can view appeal bond caps as working in tandem with established
federal policy, helping to inform the district courts as to the sufficiency of a
supersedeas bond.
3. The Case for Accommodation
A court can simply give Rule 62(d) a narrower construction by utilizing
the interpretive principles the Court described in Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc. to avoid a conflict with state law. Gasperini instructed courts
to interpret the Federal Rules “with sensitivity to important state interests

150 Section 874 was repealed by the 1948 Judicial Code. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat.
869 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.); see also Hudson City Sav. Bank v. Hampton Gardens
Ltd., 438 A.2d 323, 326 n.3 (N.J. 1981).
151 28 U.S.C. § 874 (1934) (repealed 1948).
152 Table Showing Disposition of All Sections of Former Title 28, 28 U.S.C. intro. (2006); see
also C.H. Sanders Co. v. BHAP Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 750 F. Supp. 67, 72-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
153 28 U.S.C. § 874.
154 See, e.g., Strong v. Laubach, 443 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 2006) (interpreting Rule 62(d)
as usually requiring a bond for the full amount of the judgment, unless the district court decides to
set a different amount); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1154-55 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d on
other grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (same); Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636
F.2d 755, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same); Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey
Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979) (same).
155 See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 796 (7th Cir. 1986)
(setting forth two situations in which accepting alternative security might be appropriate: “where
the defendant’s ability to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of the bond would be a waste
of money”; and “where the requirement would put the defendant’s other creditors in undue
jeopardy”); Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 757-58 (agreeing with the view that Rule 62(d) “does
not prohibit the district court from exercising a sound discretion to authorize unsecured stays in
cases it considers appropriate” and citing cases where courts have found it appropriate to depart
from the norm of requiring a bond in the full amount of the judgment).
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and regulatory policies.”156 States have passed statutes capping appeal bonds
with several important objectives in mind, including preserving the right to
appeal massive monetary judgments without forcing a judgment debtor into
bankruptcy, ensuring appellate review of erroneous judgments, protecting
payment streams from signatories to the MSA, and preventing plaintiffs
from obtaining an undue advantage in settlement negotiations.157 Meanwhile, the countervailing federal interests appear to include preserving the
discretion of district court judges in setting the amount of a supersedeas
bond and the uniform application of Rule 62(d) in federal courts across the
country. Rule 62(d), however, does not call into question an “essential
characteristic” of the federal judiciary system, such as the allocation of
power between judge and jury.158
In an effort to accommodate a state’s interest in capping an appeal bond,
a court can construe Rule 62(d) simply to control the process of obtaining a
postjudgment stay in federal courts, while allowing state law to fill in the
substance of what constitutes a sufficient supersedeas bond. The Seventh
Circuit grappled with this type of Gasperini analysis in Houben v. Telular
Corp., where it had to decide whether Rule 62(b) or state law governed an
employer’s liability with regard to the timely satisfaction of a judgment.159
At issue was a state law mandating that statutory penalties begin to accrue
fifteen days after a court orders an employer to pay wages due to an employee. 160 Before the fifteen days expired in this case, the employerdefendant had filed a post-trial motion, implicating Rule 62(b), which
grants federal judges discretion to stay execution of the judgment.161 On the
other hand, the state provision operated in a mandatory fashion, requiring

156
157

518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996).
See Behrens & Crouse, supra note 38, at 183-84; Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1112, 1124-26,
1145; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-12-103 (2013) (instituting an appeal bond cap “in order to
ensure that financial considerations do not adversely impact the right of appeal”); Meeting
Minutes, supra note 56 (statement of Marcus Osborn, Manager of Government and Public Affairs,
Arizona Manufacturers Council and Arizona Chamber of Commerce) (emphasizing that the
choice to appeal should not negatively affect a business’s ability to function).
158 See, e.g., Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-33 (discussing the Second Circuit’s failure to “attend to
‘[a]n essential characteristic of [the federal court] system’”—i.e., the division of power between
judge and jury—“when it used [a state rule] as ‘the standard for [federal] appellate review’” (first,
second, and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted)); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1958) (noting the “strong federal policy against allowing state rules to
disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts”).
159 309 F.3d 1028, 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002).
160 Id. at 1030.
161 Id. at 1029, 1038.
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penalties to accrue fifteen days after a court order, regardless of any posttrial motions.162
In Houben, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Gasperini provided a
way for the federal courts to implement “the substantive elements of [a]
state statute within the framework of federal procedures.” 163 The court
hypothesized that it could accommodate both the state statute and Rule 62
by adhering to Rule 62’s timing directives and requiring federal judges to
exercise their Rule 62(b) discretion “in favor of permitting immediate
execution” of a judgment to give effect to the state law.164 However, the
court found this accommodation to be “too much of a strain” because it
would rob federal judges of their discretion to institute a stay under Rule
62(b).165 Instead, the court fell back on the familiar dictates of Hanna and
applied the valid Federal Rule to the exclusion of the conflicting state
provision.166
Importantly, the Rule 62(b) conflict described in Houben is distinguishable from a Rule 62(d) conflict with statutes that cap appeal bonds. First, the
Rule 62(b) conflict dealt with a quintessentially procedural aspect of the
Federal Rules—timing, which is something that appeal bond reform statutes
do not interfere with. Second, Rule 62(b) explicitly vests federal judges
with the discretion to issue a stay when it provides that “the court may
stay . . . execution” upon the filing of a postjudgment motion.167 In contrast, the stay by supersedeas bond in Rule 62(d) is automatic when the
court approves the bond.168
By interpreting Rule 62(d) to reach only the process for obtaining a stay
by supersedeas bond, and by acknowledging that the judicial discretion
contained in Rule 62(d) is distinct from that afforded by other Federal Rules
where courts have refused to seek an accommodation between the state and
federal laws, courts can accommodate states’ interests in passing appeal bond
reform statutes by applying the state statutes in conjunction with Rule 62(d).

162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Id. at 1030-31, 1038.
Id. at 1034-35.
Id. at 1038.
Id. at 1038-39.
Id. at 1040.
FED. R. CIV. P. 62(b).
FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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B. RDA-Prong Analysis of Rule 62(d) and State Appeal Bond
Reform Provisions
If Rule 62(d) does not entirely cover the question of supersedeas bond
amounts in cases with massive damages awards, one must dive into “the
typical, relatively unguided Erie choice” to determine whether Rule 62(d) or
a given state statute capping appeal bonds will apply.169 At this point, courts
often point out that federal courts sitting in diversity should “apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law.”170 However, this analysis has
become so muddled that even the Supreme Court has called it a “challenging endeavor.”171 Therefore, given the impracticality of applying the distinction, instead of attempting to classify appeal bond reform statutes as
“procedural” or “substantive,” this Comment addresses the underlying state
and federal interests at play.172
1. Outcome-Determinative Test
The first step in any RDA-prong analysis is to conduct Guaranty Trust’s
outcome-determinative test, as modified by Hanna, with an eye to the twin
aims of Erie. Whether the application of a federal practice will produce
vertical forum shopping must be determined from an ex ante perspective—
when the plaintiff is considering where to file his lawsuit.173 If federal courts
sitting in diversity do not apply the state statutes that cap appeal bonds, the
risk of vertical forum shopping will increase.
For example, several states cap the amount a defendant must pay to obtain a stay via supersedeas bond in certain circumstances to a set percentage
of the defendant’s net worth.174 As a result, an astute plaintiff, hoping to win
169
170
171
172

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
See, e.g., id. at 465.
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).
Cf. Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine
from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 972-75 (2011) (discussing the futility of
the substance versus procedure distinction in the context of the Hanna prong of the Erie analysis).
173 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468-69 (discussing how the Erie doctrine concerns itself only with
differences between state and federal law that influence where a litigant chooses to bring suit). Of
course, one must also pay attention to the ability of a defendant to remove a case to federal court.
However, for the purposes of this analysis, where it is the plaintiff attempting to evade the state
appeal bond cap, this Comment focuses on the plaintiff ’s initial choice of forum as implicating
Hanna’s directive to avoid vertical forum shopping.
174 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.733 (West 2000) (capping the amount a defendant in a
certified class action must post to stay execution of a judgment at ten percent of the defendant’s
net worth); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1916 (2008) (capping the amount of a supersedeas bond in any
civil action at fifty percent of the defendant’s net worth); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 52.006 (West 2003) (same); MISS. R. APP. P. 8 (capping the amount of a supersedeas bond, as
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a judgment in excess of the state’s statutory cap, will be incentivized to sue
in federal court rather than state court. The plaintiff will realize that, if
nothing else, suing in federal court will provide a significant bargaining
advantage in settlement negotiations. If a defendant thinks he will not be
able to afford an appeal bond or will face significant financial hardship in
doing so, he may be pressured into settling regardless of the merits of his
arguments on appeal.175 Similar results will follow from statutory caps that
provide a strict monetary limit as opposed to a percentage-of-net-worth
limit.176
However, the conclusion that the application of current federal practice
would produce vertical forum shopping must be qualified. Even if vertical
forum shopping were to occur, it would not result from the federal courts
providing a different outcome per se. Rather, it would result from a plaintiff ’s educated decision that he could obtain a more favorable settlement in
federal court than in a state court that would apply the state statute capping
appeal bonds. The “expected value” of the plaintiff ’s claim would be altered.177 Further, it would be very difficult to judge from the outset when
application of Rule 62(d), as opposed to a state appeal bond reform statute,
would lead to an “inequitable administration of the laws” by significantly
altering the ultimate resolution of the case.
It is likely that if the analysis were to end here, a court would determine
vertical forum shopping would not occur because of the countervailing
pressures that could still motivate a plaintiff to sue in state court, such as a
more advantageous jury pool or an increased likelihood of obtaining a
significant punitive damages award. A pure Hanna style outcomedetermination test would therefore lead most courts to follow current
federal practice to the exclusion of state appeal bond reform statutes.
However, if a federal court accepts the argument that the possibility of a
to the punitive damages portion of a money judgment, at ten percent of the defendant’s net
worth).
175 See Behrens & Crouse, supra note 38, at 184 (asserting that “[i]ronically, the more egregious the errors at trial, and the more outrageous the award, the more likely it is that the
defendant will be unable to post a [sufficient] bond” and will be forced to settle); Harr, supra note
37, at 93-95 (chronicling the settlement negotiations between O’Keefe and Loewen, and suggesting
the role that the mandatory appeal bond played in the settlement); Rendleman, supra note 1, at
1129 (explaining how the settlement in O’Keefe foreclosed appellate reversal of the “unfair jury
verdict”).
176 The statutes that do cap the amount of an appeal bond in relation to a defendant’s net
worth typically also include a hard monetary cap and instruct courts to apply the lesser of the two.
See supra note 174 (listing examples of such statutes).
177 See Tidmarsh, supra note 59, at 880-81 (discussing how litigation strategies are influenced
by the expected value of a claim—that is, the “product of the probability of recovery and the
amount of the remedy if liability is found”).
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claim’s “expected value” being significantly altered is sufficiently “outcomedeterminative,” a balancing test weighing the various state and federal
interests should lead federal courts to apply the state appeal bond reform
statutes.
2. Byrd Balancing of State and Federal Interests
Interestingly, when the Court conducted its RDA analysis in Gasperini,
it limited itself to Hanna’s modified outcome-determinative test and did not
invoke or apply the Byrd balancing test.178 However, a comparative analysis
of different federal and state interests is useful in determining whether state
law or federal practice should govern.179 Under Byrd, when the substance–
procedure distinction does not yield a clear answer, one moves on to an
outcome-determination analysis informed by the question of whether
enforcing the state’s law will further important state policies or whether
there are strong countervailing federal interests at play favoring the application of the federal law or rule.180
There is no doubt that both Rule 62(d) and appeal bond reform statutes
are procedural in nature. 181 However, this does not mean that statutes
capping appeal bonds do not further substantive state policies.182 Statutes
instituting appeal bond caps implicate a defendant’s critical rights. States
that have enacted these statutes—particularly statutes applying to all civil
defendants and not just to MSA signatories—have made a firm choice to
preserve an attainable avenue of appeal for certain defendants by staying
execution of the trial court judgment without forcing those defendants into
bankruptcy or an otherwise precarious financial position simply to obtain a
supersedeas bond. And while the statutes are designed in part to ensure the
accuracy of judicial judgments, they also seek to influence conduct outside
178 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 422-25, 431-33 (1996); Freer, supra
note 64, at 1656.
179 Cf. John A. Lynch, Jr., Federal Procedure and Erie: Saving State Litigation Reform Through
Comparative Impairment, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 321-26 (2008) (advocating for federal courts
to use comparative impairment analysis when conducting a vertical choice-of-law analysis).
180 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1648-49.
181 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1122, 1158-59, 1165 (referring to appeal bond reform statutes as procedural); see also Bass v. First Pac. Networks, Inc., 219 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Rule 62(d) is a purely procedural mechanism . . . .”).
182 See, e.g., Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 429 (finding that while the New York state statute “contain[ed] a procedural instruction, . . . the State’s objective [wa]s manifestly substantive” (citation
omitted)); S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that some state rules, “though undeniably ‘procedural’ in the ordinary sense of the
term,” must be treated as substantive by federal courts when “the state’s intention to influence
substantive outcomes is manifest”).
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the courtroom by leveling the playing field for settlement negotiations—a
quintessentially substantive goal.183 A statute’s effect of altering the settlement landscape after a judgment, but before an appeal, can be analogized to
state statutes capping the amount of damages for a given cause of action.
Since there is agreement in the statutory damages cap context that “Erie
precludes a recovery in federal court significantly larger than the recovery
that would have been tolerated in state court,”184 it is plausible to make the
policy argument that courts should treat appeal bond statutes similarly.
Enforcing appeal bond reform statutes in federal court would ensure
that defendants maintain the rights that states bestowed on them by statute.
Byrd cautions that even if applying state law would further important state
goals, federal law should nonetheless apply if the integrity of the federal
judicial system is at stake. However, unlike in Byrd, where the balance of
power between judge and jury was in question, there is no similar issue
affecting the integrity of the federal judicial system in the context of Rule
62(d) and appeal bond reform statutes. Therefore, under a Byrd-style
analysis, not only is there a risk of vertical forum shopping, but federal
courts also have the ability to further state interests without damaging the
integrity of the federal judicial system. Under such a scenario, federal courts
should apply state statutes capping appeal bonds when applying current
federal practice would be outcome-determinative.185
CONCLUSION
The federal courts need to preserve a uniformity of process throughout
the federal court system. Requiring a defendant to obtain a postjudgment
stay according to different processes in different districts would present a
183 See Meeting Minutes, supra note 56 (statements of Sen. Al Melvin and Marcus Osborn,
Manager of Government and Public Affairs, Arizona Manufacturers Council and Arizona
Chamber of Commerce) (supporting the addition of appeal bond caps for substantive as well as
procedural reasons); cf. S.A. Healy Co., 60 F.3d at 311 (arguing that settlement practice, much like
damages, can be classified as “substantive” when vertical forum shopping is taken into consideration); Jones v. Krautheim, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1175, 1180 (D. Colo. 2002) (applying a Colorado
state law concerning pleading requirements for punitive damages because one of the law’s
purposes was to reduce the number of preemptive settlements).
184 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431.
185 Professor Burbank suggests that the Byrd balancing test does not balance state and federal
interests, but rather balances the federal interest in following federal procedural practice with the
federal interest in vertical uniformity between state and federal courts. Burbank, supra note 118, at
1949 & n.162. Even if Professor Burbank is correct, courts should still apply state statutes capping
appeal bonds. The statutes do not affect federal procedural practice, as they do not alter any
procedure. Further, the federal courts have an interest in not becoming the “go-to” forum for every
lawsuit with a potentially massive jury award.
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significant threat to the integrity of the federal judicial system. Further,
stripping a federal judge of discretion to grant a postjudgment stay, when
the Federal Rules explicitly give discretion to the judge, is not appropriate.
State statutes capping appeal bonds produce neither of these consequences.
Rather, they complement existing judicial practice in the federal courts by
lowering supersedeas bond amounts—provided the judgment creditor is still
secured in some degree—where obtaining a bond in the full amount of a
massive judgment is either unwise, impracticable, or unfair to the defendant. Adhering to statutes capping appeal bonds would therefore not significantly alter the current practice of federal judges; it would merely allow
certain defendants to appeal in federal court adverse judgments that they
already would have had the opportunity to appeal in state court.

